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1. Import duties on export goods
COMMERCIAL policy specialists are sometimes bewildered when analysing
the tariffs of many semi-industrialized countries, by the existence of high
rates of customs duties on precisely those goods for which these countries
are a priori expected to have a comparative advantage in production.
Conventional trade theory does not count on the presence of import duties
on those foreign goods which directly compete with exportables.8 In
practice, however, this is a very common case, as will be shown later.
There are a series of answers to the paradox, which are of non-theoretical
nature:
1. Internal transport or storage costs may be high enough to prevent
arbitrage inside the country, specially if the latter is big and the merchandise
concerned is bulky or deteriorates rapidly. Thus it is perfectly possible
that some regions of the country export the same good which other regions
import from third countries. This has sometimes been called border trade.
A typical case is the oil trade between Canada and the United States, the
oil being shipped in opposite directions on the east and west coasts.3
2. The tariff position considered may cover quite heterogeneous products,
so that the duty really applies only to some of the goods of the category,
while others are being exported at international prices and with no imports
taking place. Here we recognize the existence of intra-industry trade in
differentiated products, due to the existence of economies of scale brought
about by long runs operated in particular industries (e.g. chemicals).
Partly (but not completely), the problem can be overcome by taking
tariffs on highly disaggregated products.
3. The duty may be a historical curiosity or more generally speaking
redundant.
However, it is clear that there is a fourth possibility of high relevance
1
 I am indebted to Pham Thuy for her help in the computation of statistical material.
* This does not imply that an export tax exists. But the latter may be charged at the
border on the domestic good whioh leaves the country.
' Other iiitra-mdustry trade in functionally homogeneous products must be excluded
here, suoh as trade in seasonal products or entrepot trade, because it would be irrational
in those cases to impose import duties. For a comprehensive review of the theory of intra-
industry trade, see [5].
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when explaining the trade of semi-industrialized countries, namely the
existence of price discrimination. To illustrate its practical importance,
we have included an Appendix with the cases registered by the GATT
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices from mid 1970 till the end of 1975
and reported by GATT members, which either opened an investigation or
which took provisional action against the country accused of practising
dumping. From the table it clearly appears that there has been an absolute
increase in the number of investigations opened against semi-industrialized
countries' products. This is also true in relative terms when compared to
dumping practices of developed countries. To illustrate the quantitative
importance of the trade covered, two figures for each tariff position have
been included: world imports originating in the country being investigated
and the export market share of the country in total world export trade.
The year selected was the one in which the opening of the case took
place.
Contrary to the usual assumption of perfect competition in the domestic
markets considered, monopoly may prevail. If the local producer is
competitive at given world prices and thus can export, the imposition of an
import duty allows him to practice discrimination. Domestio consumers
will pay a price higher than the world price charged on exports. Of course,
the duty stands there in order to prevent the shifting back of exports to the
home country at world prices.1 Finally one important feature of the
economics of dumping should be stressed before proceeding to consider
preferential trading: the total quantity produced, as well as the allocation
of resources in the home country, is not affected by the introduction of the
tariff, whenever the local monopolist can export the good under Free
Trade.2 Of course, one must assume that the sector studied is sufficiently
small so that the relative price of factors of production is not altered by the
introduction of discriminating prices and by the subsequent distortion of
relative domestic prices.
This is so because under a profit-maximizing behaviour of the firm the
volume produced is uniquely determined by equalizing marginal costs to
the given world price.8 From the normative point of view, the exploitation
of a dumping situation, via the introduction of a prohibitive tariff, only
implies (1) a redistribution of income inside the country from consumers
to producers, which is considered neutral, assuming that 1 dollar is 1 dollar
1
 The tariff is prohibitive. Transport oosto may also help to prevent the nhifHng back,
specially in the case of bulky commodities.
1
 There is no Customs revenue collected by the Treasury because the duty is prohibitive.
Moreover, it is misleading to think of the domestio price in terms of a tariff-inclusive price,
because there may be 'a lot of water' in the tariff.
1
 We shall see later that a real distortion is introduced by the tariff whenever it allows
the dumper to export at world prices not oovering its own costs.
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for everybody; (2) the appearance of the conventional net loss zone sup-
ported by consumers, through the rising of domestic prices over and above
the world price. From the international viewpoint there is no distortion
whenever the minimum average total cost of the domestic supplier is less
than the given world price. In this case, as economists have held for a
long time, it is not rational for foreign countries to introduce anti-dumping
or other countervailing duties. Only if export prices do not cover average
total costs is there ground to accuse the dumper of unfair competition, as
most of the national legislations and even article VT of GATT imply. As is
well known, the spirit of most of the existing legislation is that there is such
a thing as a 'normal' value of the product, which inevitably leads to the con-
clusion that any other price far below the latter is 'abnormal', thus 'unfair'.
The idea is probably that what is sold at these prices does not cover costs.
However, one may have serious doubts on the real importance of this case
for these reasons: When analysing the Appendix, which gives us a rough
idea of the real world situation, it appears that in most cases we can expect
the countries concerned have a true comparative advantage in the produo-
tion of the goods they actually export. They are thus efficient world
producers. There is also some indirect evidence supporting our opinion in
the report of the Working Party of GATT, adopted recently.1 Developing
countries stressed that their domestic prices are not a reasonable measure of
the 'normal value' of the product and that these should not be used for
price comparisons to prove the existence of dumping. Acoording to their
view, only export prices applied to third countries should be investigated.
Furthermore one developing country said that balance-of-payments
difficulties explained the need for high domestic prices. Both statements
probably point to the fact that tariffs, which were introduced after the
Second World War for infant-industry reasons, have succeeded in stimulat-
ing the substitution of imports, as a first stage, and the development of
exporte later. However, the tariff has not yet been reduced, allowing
dumping in the cases where imperfect competition prevails in the domestic
market. Of course, developing countries are caught between two fires
when they reply to the accusation of dumping: on the one hand they wish to
prove that they are competitive in the products they export. On the other
hand, they wish to try to convince developed countries that their domestic
prices are not the 'normal' ones, which means of course that they are
higher. A neoclassical economist might sympathize with this last idea,
in so far as a tariff-inclusive price has nothing to do with the 'normal'
price or, for that matter, the 'natural price' concept put forward by the
first Classical economists.
1
 Document L/4239, 21 November 1975, reproduced in GATT's Basic Instruments and
Special Documents, supplement no. 22.
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2. Customs Union theory and monopolistic price discrimination:
explaining Customs Union formation
Joining a Customs Union or a Free-Trade Area allows the monopolist
who practises dumping in a semi-industrialized country to reach the newly
available markets at fixed prices that he cannot influence but which are
higher than world market prices. He cannot monopolize his own domestio
market any more because the rules of the Free-Trade Area or of the Customs
Union imply that the country eliminates its tariffs on trade originating
in the region. Thus two effects may be expected to follow simultaneously
in the country: a positive consumption effect brought about by the reduc-
tion of the domestic price and a negative export-trade diversion effect
brought about by the opening of access to a high-cost area. There is no
import-trade diversion, because the pre-existing tariff in the semi-
industrialized country was prohibitive. Note that total exports do not
necessarily increase since the additional production may be absorbed by
additional local consumption.
The practical implication of these observations is that they help to explain
Customs Union or Free-Trade Area formation1 in that the conclusion of such
kind of agreements may be a way to convince the local producer to drop mono-
polistic practices and stop asking for protection, while making consumers
happier; it is also an intelligent form of selling to the big trading bloc some
discriminatory tariff concessions (which will be perceived as reverse prefer-
ences) against other direct preferences*
Casual investigation by Victoria Curzon and Robert Middleton on EFTA
shows that surprisingly few dumping cases were investigated during the first
decade of existence of this association. In fact, this is not surprising, taking
into consideration that the elimination of tariffs in the area allows for price
discrimination based only on non-tariff barriers or transport costs.8 How-
ever, one should not conclude that the situation has improved from the
welfare point of view. In fact what has happened is that the inefficient
monopolist, who would have disappeared as a result of multilateral tariff
reduction negotiations, has survived by extending its area of discrimination,
although sharing its privilege with the other producers of the Free-Trade
Area.
1
 There is no diiferanoe between adopting one or the other formula, aa long as in the
latter oase it is the wiring semi-industrialized, country whioh adopts the big-country taring
• The theory of Customs Union formation was elaborated in the last deoade by the late
H. Johnson and other authors. It tries to explain better the aotual behaviour of govern-
ments, and may be seen as a direct oonsequenoe of the soeptioism brought about by the
general theory of the second best, developed in the late 1950B; see [6].
* See V. Curzon [I], pp. 187-40; R. Middleton [8], pp. 86-8. Prioe discrimination oould,
however, survive in the area if we allow for the ezistenoe of shifting effeote 'a la' Shibata,
see [11].
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3. A glance at some relevant statistics
In order to cast some light on to the presumed dumping situation, we
have reproduced below Table I which shows GATT duties of six Mediter-
ranean countries for eight selected categories of products. These countries
have all concluded partial preferential arrangements with the European
TABLE I
Range of GATT rates of Customs duties
Chapters of the Brussels
Nomenclature Spain Israel Morooeo Tunisia Turkey Egypt
07.02. Frozen battered
onion rings
16.04. Tinned sardines
20. Preparations of
vegetables, fruit, or other
parts of plants
29.16. Citric aoid
39. Artificial resins and
plastio materials
60/61/65. Knitted and
crocheted goods, articles
of apparel and olothing
accessories of textile
fabrio, headgear and parts
thereof
64. Footwear
87-02. Road vehiolee
6%
20-60
15-60
(mostly
30-50)
15-25
60-70
35-55
10+0.15
IL/kg
20-50
Mostly
26-60
120-60
60 50-75
36-80 20-60 70-100 60-160
40-70
Source: National Tariff Schedules; International Customs Journal, International Customs
Tariff Bureau, Brussels, 1975-6.
Economic Community in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 Moreover, as
a Becond stage of the process and in the framework of what has been called
the Mediterranean Policy of the EEC, some of them have already signed
Free-Trade Area agreements with the Community (Israel, 1976; Morocco,
1976; Tunisia, 1976). We have indicated the extreme values of the range of
ad valorem taxes applied to the goods covered by each of the categories of
the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. No figure was included when some
duties of the corresponding category were zero, as justified on p. 127, n. 1,
nor when there were specific duties or non-tariff barriers instead of ad
valorem taxes. There was also no point in including the range of duties
when the corresponding export figures included in Table II were not
available. This table was set up by selecting first the Standard Inter-
national Trade Classification (SITC) categories, at the 3- or 4-digit-level
1
 Turkey oonoluded an association agreement with the EEC in 1963, which should
lead to the areation of a common Customs Union after an interim period of twenty-two
years. Thus de facto only partial preferential trading prevails up to the present.
to
&
TABLE II
Column 1: Total exports In value (millions $) 1070
Column 2: Export market share In OECD Import trade, 1970 (in %)
Column 3: Total Imports In value (millions S) 1970
o
I
Spain Tunisia Emvt
Frozen battered onion
rings
Tinned sardines
Preparation of vegetable*
fruit, or other parts of
plants
Citric acid
Artificial resins, plastic
materials
Knitted and crocheted
goods, articles of apparel
and do tiling accessories
of textile fabric, head-
gear and parts thereof
Footwear
Boad vehicles
183.393 12 10.505
10.729 0.37 78.784
40.118 8.14 —
4.662 0.27 —
8.045 0.10 17.764
47.051 0.99 13.258 61.275 1.08 2.241
104.861 7.12 —
84.799 0.83 38.761
58.050 8 —
4.986 0.10 —
8.444 0.27 —
1.000 0.02 1.132
6.684 0.43 —
4.176 0.08 — 10.183 0.21 —
2.805 — 28.770
O
Sources: Yearbook of International Trad* Statistic) 1070-1071, United Nations, New York, 1978.
StatUUoal Paptn, teriu it, no. 34, Standard International Trade ClnuifinUion, RevUed, United Nation*, New York, 1961.
H
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of aggregation, which correspond exactly to the Brussels Nomenclature
tariff positions chosen. For each Mediterranean country three figures have
been considered: total exports by value, export shares of the concerned
country in total OECD import trade and total imports of these countries
from the OECD area. The last figure has been included in order to give
some notion of the heterogeneity of the particular SITC class.
The first two figures give a rough idea of the importance of this export
trade. From the statistics analysed it appears that, notwithstanding the
fact that some of the duties may be redundant,1 there must be some price
discrimination, given the importance of moat of the duties. Of course, the
lower the Mediterranean country import figure is, the higher the probability
of existence of dumping. Thus plastio materials both in Spain and in
Israel must be regarded with caution.
Road vehicles in Spain may be an industry where dumping may appear
because oligopolistic market structures prevail in this sector. On the
other hand, clothing in the six countries considered should be dropped
from this study as apparently atomistic market conditions prevail in all
these cases. An interesting case is footwear in Spain because it seems to be
a priori an awkward example of potential dumping due to the well-known
existence of thousands of small production units. However, as spelled out
in the appendix to the article, Spain has been accused of practising dumping
in the past in this field (women's footwear, 1970).
Middle-of-the-road cases are canned products (vegetables and fruits) in
Israel, Tunisia and Turkey, where the existence of large government inter-
vention (such as export government bodies or nation-wide co-operative
organizations) allows for the existence of cartel conditions. When we look
at factual cases (see Appendix), we see that in these last years, dumping
investigations were opened on green olives packed in glass coming from
Spain, and on apple juice concentrates originating in Greece. For instance,
the import duty rate applied by this last country on the same product is
42 per cent. And the same happens for other products in which both coun-
tries play a leading role in world trade (i.e. steel reinforcing bars and
ceramic floor tiles, both mentioned in the Appendix).
However, the clearest examples of dumping by Mediterranean countries,
where the high domestic tariff played a crucial role, are the cases of tinned
sardines of Morocco and of onion products from Spain. Here we have two
products where both countries play an important role in world trade and
where the product selected was homogeneous, while imports into the two
countries were small, due to the presence of customs duties on both com-
modities in the two Mediterranean countries considered.
1
 Note that because the export figure may correspond to duty-free goods, ranges of
tariffs starting at zero have been excluded from Table I.
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From this rapid survey of the actual situation, we can state that price
discrimination, due to the combined existence of monopoly conditions and
protective import duties, is a relevant issue when examining trade relations
of semi-industrialized countries with developed countries. The issue will
probably come to the forefront of future negotiations between Spain,
Portugal, and Greece on the one hand, and the European Economic
Community on the other, for the entry of the former into the EEC. The
model presented may be of some use to explain the interests of the different
partners involved in these negotiations.
To illustrate the relevance of the observations presented above, plastic
materials in Israel (chapter 39) in Table I have been selected as a case study.
This country is supposed to eliminate its import duties on this tariff
position by 1985 under the Free-Trade agreement signed in May 1975
with the EEC. The prevailing rates of the Common External Tariff of the
EEC lie between 7 and 18.4 per cent.1 Positive consumption effects to be
reaped by Israeli local users are to be small due to the fact that plastic
materials are mostly intermediate products, with low demand price
elasticities. On the other hand, important redistribution effects may take
place, considering the fact that local gross production amounted to more
than 47 million dollars in 1970.* But for the country as a whole the net
outcome of free access to the plastic materials market to the EEC may be
low or even negative in view of the inefficient and artificial development of
this branch of industry.
4. Some final remarks
The object of this paper was to show that a dumping situation exploited
by the producers of a small country in a free-trade environment promotes
mainly a redistribution of inoome in this country but not a distortion in
the allocation of resources. When the country decides to join a trading
club by signing a free-trade arrangement with it, covering the sector in
which dumping takes place, the first effect tends to disappear, while a
real distortion emerges from the new situation, brought about by export
trade diversion from third countries towards the partner country implying
a waste of resources since production is artificially extended.
As shown, there is some empirical evidence that semi-industrialized
1
 These tariffs already take into account Kennedy Bound developments although the
final reduotions applied were less than the scheduled ones, due to their conditional accep-
tance against the elimination of the well-known American Selling Prioe regulation by the
U.S.
* This figure includes also synthetio rubber as well as man-made fibres, which are mainly
oovered by chapters 40, 51, and 60 of the Brussels Nomenclature. See The Growth of World
Industry, 1971 edition, vol. i, General Industrial Statistics, 1961-70, United Nations, New
York, 1973. When man-made fibres are added to the general export figure for plastio
materials inoluded in Table L the Israel total amounts to more than $20 millions.
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countries around the Mediterranean are practising (maybe involuntarily)
dumping in neighbouring developed countries, by letting up-dated high-
level tariffs subsist in sectors where they have acquired, in the process of
industrialization, comparative advantage. Their progressive economio
association with the EEC is ftliminftting this highly visible and irritating
distortion by supressing redundant tariffs, but at the same time these
countries are undoing a part of the progress made since the beginning of
industrialization by fostering production at a cost no longer competitive
at the world level.
University of Geneva
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APPENDIX
Investigations opened on alleged dumping practised by semi-industrialized countries; exports concerned and country's export market
share in world trade
Year Product
1970 Files and rasps
1970 Fertilizers
1970 Women's footwear
1970 Glass sheet
1970 Pig-iron
1970 Gelatine explosives
1971 Steel pipes
1971 Ammonium nitrate fertilizers
1971 Eggs, chicken in the shell
1971 Sulphur
1971 Monochrome and colour television
1971 Bicycle tyres and tubes
1971 Apple-juioe concentrate
1971 Carpets of coconut fibre and thread
1971 Wire
1971 Yams of acrylio fibres
1971 Yams of aorylic fibres
1971 Wood ohipboard
1972 Steel-wire rope
1972 Vinyl film printed
1972 Iron for reinforced concrete and steel sheete
1973 Complex ternary fertilizers
1973 Vacuum vessels
1973 Maleio anhydrine
Products'
origin
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Taiwan
Brazil
Yugoslavia
Spain
Yugoslavia
Mexico
Mexico
Taiwan
Taiwan
Greece
India
India
Taiwan
South Korea
Portugal
Taiwan
Brazil
Spain
Yugoslavia
Hong Kong
Spain
Exports of the
given year
(value in
millions $)
1.493
4.491
104.361
N l .
23.786
2.841
6.948
1.877
N l .
15.820
N A .
N l .
24.731
25.843
0.276
N l .
9.023
4.012
N l .
1.612
6.223
N l .
13.476
N l .
Export market
share in world
imports (in %)
0.06
0.34
6.36
N l .
2.09
1.70
0.74
0.39
N l .
6.73
N l .
N l .
2.38
2.48
0.05
N l .
N l .
0.79
N l .
0.14
0.56
N l .
0.34
N l .
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Year
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1073
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
Product
Steel filea
Steel files
Liquid sprayers
Deformed steel reinforcing bars
Picker stioks (for textile maehinee)
Vinyl film printed
Tile, ceramio glazed wall
Egg products
Egg products
Green olives, packed in glass
Ternary compound fertilizers
Acrylic-fibre socks
Acrylio-fibre sooks
Saccharin and its salts
Self-adhesive photo albums
Transit car seats
Polypropylene and polyethylene rope
Colour TV sets
Frozen battered onion rings
Ramin dowels and mouldings
Ramin dowels and mouldings
Plywood paper overlaid or printed
Plywood paper overlaid or printed
Louvred doore
Tinned sardines
Playing cards
Fibreglass fishing-rods
Fibreglass fishing-rods
Products'
origin
India
Portugal
South Korea
Mexico
Mexico
Argentina
Philippines
Israel
Yugoslavia
Spain
Yugoslavia
South Korea
Taiwan
South Korea
South Korea
Brazil
South Korea
Singapore
Spain
Singapore
Malaysia
Singapore
Taiwan
Taiwan
Morocoo
Hong Kong
Taiwan
South Korea
Exports of the
given year
{value in
millions %)
0.022
1.066
N.A.
N.A.
0.215
2.631
3.960
2.087
0.407
91.361
N.A.
26.439
N.A.
N.A.
20.926
20.680
N.A.
37.408
183.393
4.427
14.742
59.878
N.A.
N.A.
68.050
10.479
N.A.
N.A.
Export market
share in world
imports [in %)
0.005
0.23
N.A.
N.A.
0.03
0.18
0.51
0.47
0.09
5.45
N.A.
1.45
N.A.
N.A.
0.94
0.19
N.A.
1.59
10.72
0.37
1.26
4.573
N.A.
N.A.
7.21
0.48
N.A.
N.A.
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Year
1976
1975
1976
1976
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
1975
1975
1975
1075
Product
Oil and air filters
Hardboard
Acrylic sheet
Citric acid
Citrio acid
Slide projectors
Files and rasps
Natural rubber (latex) balloons
Battery post and terminal oleaning brushes
Wooden clothes-pins
Wood panels
Steel reinforoing bars
Ladies raincoats
Portland hydraulic cement
Multi-metal lithographic plates
Monosodium glutamate
Ceramic floor tiles
Products'
origin
Israel
Philippines
Taiwan
Israel
Mexico »
Singapore
India
Mexico
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Brazil
Spain
Hong Kong
Mexico
Mexico
South Korea
Spain
Exports of the
given year
(value in
millions $)
N l .
48.629
N.A.
4.652
N.A.
2.358
6.296
N.A.
59.466
5.790
18.349
66.245
104.728
N.A.
N.A.
N l .
64.351
Export market
share in world
imports (in %]
N.A.
1.76
N.A.
0.21
N.A.
0.11
0.19
N.A.
1.66
0.49
1.66
8.05
6.34
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
3.92
Sources: QATT, Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices; United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1972-3, 1975 (vol. II).
N.A. = not available.
